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FAMILY LAW – SOLIDARITY OR 
DISARRAY? 
Bill Atkin* 
Professor Gordon Anderson and labour law are synonymous in New Zealand. Gordon has 
provided a vision for the future of labour law. This article is offered in a similar spirit. It was 
prepared for a conference on "The Future of Family Law", held in Auckland on 20 September 
2018 with distinguished guest, Lady Brenda Hale, President of the United Kingdom Supreme 
Court. The history of family law in New Zealand is full of remarkable landmarks. Many align 
with the rights of various groups: children, women, Māori, those with intellectual disabilities, 
LGBTI+ communities and abuse victims. If we dig deeper, we find that the various parts do not 
make a very coherent and harmonious whole. The law is tugged in different directions. This 
article draws on the concept of "family solidarity", refashioned for New Zealand purposes as 
"family and community solidarity". Could this help develop a unifying theme? Could it form the 
basis for future family law reform? Developments such as legislation on child poverty reduction, 
the Ministry for Children and relationship property law are briefly explored.  
I  INTRODUCTION 
In many ways the history of family law is one of progress. The line of achievements continues 
to rise with the recognition, among other things, of children's rights, of diversity, and of the need 
to tackle the insidious levels of abuse. Yet, significant blips can also occur in the line. The review 
of the family justice changes made in 2014 illustrates this perfectly.1 
Further, the law does not always follow the same line of progress. We have two major pieces 
of legislation dealing with the care of children that rather awkwardly tug in different directions: 
the Care of Children Act 2004 (COCA) and the Oranga Tamariki Act 1989 (OTA), with its 
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alternative English title the Children's and Young People's Well-being Act 1989. In addition there 
is the Children's Act 2014, originally entitled the Vulnerable Children Act 2014.  
In the financial area, the approaches to property and maintenance are very different and child 
support sits as an outlier within the Inland Revenue Department. On child support, in words that 
we can apply to New Zealand, Lady Hale said: "we have now separated the financial and caring 
responsibilities of parenthood, and I wonder how far this really serves the children's interests".2 
There is a sense in which the various parts of family law do not make a very coherent and 
harmonious whole.3 This is likely to be because we are unclear about the underlying driving 
principles. While the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child has widespread 
acceptance, we are less sure about other concepts.4 In this article, I wish to promote the idea of 
family solidarity as the basis for developing a unifying theme, or what I have labelled "family 
and community solidarity". In a new edition of my book on relationship property, against the 
backdrop of the New Zealand Law Commission's recent project on the topic,5 I suggested that 
family solidarity be the starting point in terms of the values that should form the basis of law 
reform: "[t]his concept means that we take seriously the domestic relationships that people form 
and not treat the parties like strangers or individual agents."6 Other approaches are possible. For 
example, some people will favour a much more laissez faire approach, others will focus on 
autonomy, others on dependency and vulnerability, and others with an emphasis on caring.7 
Gillian Douglas has just published an important book entitled Obligation and Commitment in 
Family Law,8 the title itself conveying much of the philosophy. 
I have focused on family solidarity because it has synergies with distinctive aspects of legal 
policy in Aotearoa New Zealand, in particular indigenous Māori culture. It also has a positive 
ring in contrast to a lot of family law that sounds negative because it is often about relationship 
breakdown. I also draw heavily on a special issue of the Child and Family Law Quarterly devoted 
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to "family solidarity". The lead article by Anne Barlow, law professor at the University of Exeter 
is a compelling account of family solidarity. She takes the view that:9 
… there remains an important role for family law to play in regulating family life beyond any 
bilateral contract between partners and … this should involve placing a positive, modernised 
reconceptualisation of family solidarity as a norm at the heart of family law. 
And again:10 
… a new approach which applauds and recognises the benefits and risks of engaging in the joint 
enterprise of family solidarity should be constructed to embody notions of equal value of different 
family roles and recognise the limits these (for good cause) place on the exercise of individual 
autonomy. 
We can "applaud" this for many reasons, including the echoes that ring in s 1N(b) of the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA) to the effect that "all forms of contribution … are treated as 
equal" – New Zealand law thus already has signs of family solidarity. Let us be blunt however: 
the approach has little or no truck with the formerly fashionable neo-liberal ideology that once 
prevailed. This does not mean that the language of individual rights is alien (the United Nations 
Convention is about children's "rights"),11 but it is not the dominant vehicle for assessing values 
in family law. 
II  WHAT IS FAMILY SOLIDARITY?  
"Family solidarity" is a phrase commonly used by continental Europeans where its heritage 
is longstanding. It is heard less in the common law world. Indeed, I have sometimes been 
bemused by it. Barlow argues in favour of a dynamic and revitalised model that resonates with 
contemporary issues:12 
The term "family solidarity" is … an evolving concept which encapsulates the joint enterprise, 
mutual support and obligations which modern family life (in all its different forms) encompasses 
from a moral and economic perspective and which is often reflected and reinforced in legal 
regulation. It stands in contrast to individualistic notions of autonomy and recognises the altruism 
which is often required to fulfil its demands. 
Another contributor to the Child and Family Law Quarterly, Tone Sverdrup, Professor of Law at 
the University of Oslo, says: "[f]amily solidarity includes acting on the basis of what is best for 
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the family as a whole and putting family interests ahead of self-interests."13 One of the key marks 
of family solidarity then is to put the family ahead of the individual. In New Zealand, one of the 
great challenges to conventional family came in the 1980s with the Māori renaissance.14 It 
heavily influenced the passage of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 
(now OTA). To be frank, it has not greatly affected other legislation subsequently passed – 
perhaps until the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Oranga Tamariki) Legislation 
Act 2017 and even that was riddled with controversy. 15  The Māori vision of family and 
personhood is a contrast to the classic Westernised "nuclear family": the person "belongs" to 
whānau, hapū and iwi.16 A person gets meaning from this sense of family and from the cultural 
heritage that lies in whakapapa. The Europeans of the past who coined the phrase "family 
solidarity" may not have had Māori in mind or other cultures, such as Pasifika cultures that are 
increasingly important in the New Zealand context, but can we not do so under the Barlow 
"modernised reconceptualisation of family solidarity as a norm at the heart of family law"?17 I 
wonder whether whanaungatanga (family relationships) is not very similar to "family solidarity". 
III  THE PERILS OF FAMILY SOLIDARITY? 
A  "Patriarchy" in Disguise? 
The origins of the phrase "family solidarity" are steeped in the days of patriarchy. Is there a 
danger that, in using this language, we may be playing into the hands of those who still promote 
male headship, wifely submission, beating of children and heteronormative relationships within 
marriage? Is it a conservative anti-progressive fight-back? 
The Barlow concept is an "evolving" one.18 While it is about values, it is not an approach 
that is stuck in the stone tablets of the past. To be of any use, it must relate to the real world and 
to the genuine policy choices that are being made. The synergies with tikanga Māori have already 
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been noted: beyond this, it is a reminder that Sverdup's phrase "what is best for the family as a 
whole" is of general application.19 The approach is inclusive, not exclusive, and so the reality of 
de facto relationships is taken on-board. The same is true of same-sex relationships, as well as 
familial links with elder citizens. 20  Gender implications are major considerations in a 
modernised concept of family solidarity. Indeed, the old patriarchal model where power and 
status rested with the husband could actually be seen as anti-solidarity in modern terms. This is 
because the husband was (in theory) the only party allowed to exercise autonomy, which is a 
very one-sided version of autonomy. The model of family solidarity as a joint enterprise does 
not fit with this. 
The effects on children are also relevant. In 2007, Parliament voted overwhelmingly to 
abolish the parental "right" to correct children by using physical forms of punishment.21 This 
was not intended to be a panacea for all child abuse but it signalled more generally that children 
are not objects with no say until they reach adulthood. Rather, they are integral participants in 
the joint enterprise that is captured by the refashioned concept of family solidarity. We find this 
in statutory form in the guardianship rules in COCA. Under s 16, guardians (usually the parents) 
are to contribute to a child's development and determine important questions like schooling "for" 
or "with" the child. The preposition "with" gradually but surely takes over from "for". In 
Hawthorne v Cox, the High Court emphasised that, as a child gets older, the guardianship role is 
more one of counsellor than decision maker.22 This is a far cry from a model that lets fathers 
beat their teenagers because they do not like what they say or do. 23 Very arguably, these 
developments are all part of a modernised concept of family solidarity. 
B  Abuse? 
A much more serious challenge to family solidarity is that the family can be a dangerous 
place. In New Zealand we have high levels of child abuse and domestic violence. The home is 
not always the safe place that the ideal conjures up. It could be argued that the family is the venue 
for "insolidarity" and insecurity, from which people need to be protected. The novelist, Maurice 
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daughter in the middle of the night. 
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Gee, said that "[f]amilies are factories for neurosis".24 This factory can continue even when 
family members are no longer co-residing – as is often true of elder abuse. Can the promotion of 
family solidarity survive in the face of these realities? 
Undoubtedly, in abusive situations, the number one priority must be safety. This may entail 
the splintering of families and relationships, rather than staying together and putting up with 
abuse for the sake of some grander scheme. A modernised model would characterise abuse as 
antithetical to real family solidarity because the enterprise would not be joint, the support would 
not be mutual and the commitment would not be free. So, in New Zealand the Family Violence 
Act 2018 (FVA) (which replaced the Domestic Violence Act 1995), OTA and COCA (s 5(a) of 
which makes the child's safety and protection from violence a mandatory principle) are certainly 
consistent with family solidarity.  
Beyond these first aid measures, the vision must be about healing. This does not mean 
patching things up and forcing parties back into situations that had become intolerable. It does 
mean, where possible, some form of rehabilitation and restoration, in particular where parties 
still have joint responsibilities for children. The three Acts deal with this differently. FVA 
requires respondents to go to anti-violence programmes; OTA officially places its faith in the 
family group, whānau, hapū and iwi; while COCA contains rules that emphasise ongoing contact, 
even if supervised. All three of these approaches have their virtues but do not "talk" to one 
another very effectively.  
The real answer to the challenge of abuse is that this is not true of most families. Family 
solidarity invites us to consider the bigger picture. It is not limited in its ambit and should be seen 
as universally applicable. This leads to the next point. 
IV  WHY ADD "COMMUNITY"?  
I suggest that in New Zealand we should talk about "family and community solidarity". 
Families do not exist in splendid isolation but are part of a wider network. Whānau connect to 
hapū and iwi, and beyond. Pākehā families form links with other families, through all kinds of 
social and economic activities. Family policy should recognise these realities. Community or 
state assistance to struggling families and to those who are in need of protection including those 
who get rest home subsidies is vital. Yet, so are other policies of much more general application 
such as paid parental leave, the primary and secondary education system and superannuation. 
Community solidarity goes beyond "social investment"25 targeted at those who are characterised 
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as needy, dysfunctional or vulnerable. This is not to deny a significant domain of freedom for 
families but to recognise that they are socially interconnected.  
A further, rather more legal, aspect arises. Lawyers draw a distinction between private and 
public law. Traditionally it has been made in family law as well, treating breakdown and divorce 
with their concomitant issues about property and children as "private matters", whereas the state's 
role is similar to the way it resolves a contract dispute between strangers: largely genuflecting to 
the autonomy and independence of the parties. Public law's role in family law is restricted, on 
this view, primarily to where the state intervenes to remove a child into care or take some other 
form of protective action. 
Sverdrup challenges this distinction.26 She states:27 
The concepts and mind-set of private law are primarily developed with a view to market relationships 
and the key question … is whether they are suitable and equally applicable when the conflict is 
between two parties in a couple relationship. "Solidarity" may be an apt description of the essential 
ingredient of the workings of the latter relationship which distinguishes it from others governed by 
private law principles.  
And, "[w]hen family law practitioners and scholars look at the couple relationship through this 
private-law lens, they might only see two persons and not the collective unit."28 
When we ask about the law's role in relation to the welfare of children, the protection of 
victims and survivors of domestic abuse, the financial disadvantage of the mother who has been 
the primary carer of children, the person who lacks mental capacity, and in many other situations, 
it is unhelpful to fall back on private law rhetoric. Family and community solidarity, it is 
suggested, is a better driver of family policy. 
So, we turn to a closer examination of the current law in New Zealand. I look at two topics: 
child law and relationship property. 
V  THE LAW RELATING TO CHILDREN  
OTA and COCA are the two main pieces of legislation that deal with the law relating to 
children in New Zealand. At the same time we have the Status of Children Act 1969, the outdated 
Adoption Act 1955, the Child Support Act 1991, the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology 
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Act 2004, the Children's Commissioner Act 2003, the Children's Act, and FVA, which children 
can invoke. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is a vital underlying 
foundation stone, although it has not been fully implemented as part of New Zealand's domestic 
law.29 To list all of these Acts implies a fragmentation of the law and a need for some coherence.  
Two developments are encouraging signs that we may partially be heading in the right 
direction: (i) the Child Poverty Reduction Bill 2018, which heralded changes to the Children's 
Act,30 and (ii) we now have a Ministry for Children, Oranga Tamariki. 
A  "Vulnerable" 
Let us deal first with the irksome word "vulnerable". The Children's Commissioner, Judge 
Andrew Becroft, described this as "cripplingly disappointing" when it was included in the 
original name of the new Ministry.31 The adjective has now gone with the change of Minister 
following the 2017 election. The problem is that the word is aimed at certain children who are 
believed to be potential candidates for abuse or deprivation and who are thus stigmatised. There 
is a sense in which all children are "vulnerable" and this is recognised in the publication rules in 
s 11B of the Family Court Act 1980 which apply to all children and other "vulnerable" persons. 
However, the use in the context under discussion is a reference to a narrower group of children.  
B  Child Poverty Reduction Bill 2018 and the Children's Act 2014 
Family and community solidarity embraces all children, not some of them. The Children's 
Act, as amended during the process of enacting the Child Poverty Reduction Bill, contains a 
significant change from the original Vulnerable Children Act. It requires the creation of a 
strategy, the first element of which is "improving the well-being of all children".32 Admittedly, 
the provision also refers to "the well-being of children with greater needs" as being "a particular 
focus", along with references to child poverty and socio-economic disadvantage and "core 
  
29  Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 4. The Convention is included in sch 2 to the Children's 
Commissioner Act 2003 and the Commissioner has functions in relation to the Convention (s 12). See 
also the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Oranga Tamariki) Legislation Act 2017, s 11, 
which inserts s 5(1)(b)(i) into the principal OTA. The new s 6AA of the Children's Act 2014, as added 
by the Select Committee during the passage of the Child Poverty Reduction Bill 2018, mentions 
obligations under the Convention as well as the United Nations Convention of the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, though it also states that this does not "give domestic legal effect to, or implement in 
New Zealand law" any of the obligations. 
30  Part 3 of the Child Poverty Reduction Bill contained amendments to the Vulnerable Children Act 2014 
and changed its name to the Children's Act. Part 3 became the Children's Amendment Act 2018. The 
Child Poverty Reduction Act 2018 itself deals with measurements and targets relating to child poverty. 
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32  New s 6(1)(a) of the Children's Act (emphasis added). 
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populations of interest to the department".33 The Bill also used the phrase "at-risk children",34 
and the Children's Act provides for an "oranga tamariki action plan" that relates to these 
children.35 The content of the strategy as set out in the new s 7 reflects its original location in the 
Child Poverty Reduction Bill and much of it is about "measurable outcomes" relating to child 
poverty and socio-economic disadvantage. Nevertheless, the amended Act represents a distinct 
move from a "vulnerable" class of children to a more universal vision that aligns with family and 
community solidarity. As the Office of the Children's Commissioner said in its submission on 
the Child Poverty Reduction Bill:36 
The purpose [of the Bill] highlights both the need to support the well-being of all children while 
simultaneously attending to the higher needs of particular groups of children. It encompasses a 
proportionate universalist approach to well-being, which the evidence supports.  
Much of this discussion of the Bill and the revised Children's Act may sound somewhat 
removed from the classic categories of family law. Yet, if the government has a child strategy, it 
is surely odd if it has no impact on what family lawyers and other professionals do. By the same 
token, it would be odd if the strategy failed to take classic family law interests into account. This 
is indeed a failure of the new legislation. The list above of statutes that deal with child law in 
New Zealand is far removed from the list in the Act: the amended s 5 specifies FVA, the 
Education Act 1989, the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, OTA, the Policing 
Act 2008 and the Social Security Act 2018 with a catch-all for other Acts that the Governor-
General can add in the future. The departments and instruments of the Crown responsible for 
these Acts are the "children's agencies" that produce the strategy. 37 Under the new s 6D, 
consultation must occur with children or their representatives and with Māori representatives 
such as iwi and Māori organisations. Wisely, the Select Committee added consultation with the 
Children's Commissioner. 
The list of statutes just noted contains omissions. For example, COCA is not mentioned, yet 
the welfare and best interests of children when their parents separate should surely be a core 
feature of any child strategy. Likewise, the list of those to be consulted about the strategy omits 
the Family Court and allied services such as mediators. In a consummate submission on the 
  
33  Children's Act, s 6(1)(b). 
34  Primarily in sch 5, which amended various other Acts and legislative instruments. 
35  Children's Act, ss 7D–11. 
36  Office of the Children's Commissioner "Submission to the Social Services and Community Committee 
on the Child Poverty Reduction Bill 2018" at [88]. 
37  Children's Act, s 5 definition of "children's agencies". 
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original version of the Child Poverty Reduction Bill, 38  the Office of the Children's 
Commissioner (OCC), which was in general "excited" by the changes to the 2014 Act, referred 
to the absence of reference of that Office, remedied, as noted above, by the Select Committee. 
The OCC recommended that the strategy be renamed "New Zealand's Strategy for Child Well-
being" and proffered its definition of well-being:39 
We strive toward high levels of child well-being, where all children have the resources and support 
that is required for them to develop and thrive, able to enjoy their rights, achieve their full potential 
and participate as equal members of New Zealand society. Child well-being is inseparable from 
family and whānau well-being.  
The link to family and whānau is something that the Select Committee clarified by requiring the 
Minister in devising the strategy to have regard to the principle that "children should be viewed 
in the context of their families, whānau, hapū, and iwi, other culturally recognised family groups 
and communities".40 This, it is argued, should reinforce the concept of family and community 
solidarity. 
The Human Rights Commission picked up another gap in the original Child Poverty 
Reduction Bill. 41  New Zealand's international obligations, especially the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 42 were ignored and the Commission's submission 
recommended that an additional objective of the strategy should be to advance children's rights 
under the Convention and other international treaties and instruments. The new s 6A, as added 
by the Select Committee, now refers to New Zealand's international obligations, and under s 6C 
the Minister must have regard to children's rights, along with "children's intrinsic value and 
inherent dignity". This will resonate with family lawyers and other professionals. 
C  The Ministry 
It is good to have a dedicated Ministry for Children, Oranga Tamariki. However, it is more 
accurately "the Ministry for some things to do with the care of children". Not unlike the 
Children's Act, it does not bring together all the things to do with children. One totally 
comprehensive Ministry is not viable, as specialist tasks such as education and health need to 
stay where they are. However, the classic family law aspects of the care of children arguably 
should be brought together so that a proper overview of policy can be matched with law-making 
  
38  Office of the Children's Commissioner, above n 36, at [73]. 
39  At [91] (emphasis added). 
40  New s 6C(c) of the Children's Act. 
41  Human Rights Commission "Submission to the Social Services and Community Committee on the Child 
Poverty Reduction Bill 2018" at [37]. See Child Poverty Reduction Bill 2018 (14-1). 
42  Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 4. 
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that is less contradictory than at present. This includes moving some matters from several other 
departments, including the Ministry of Justice. The following list of relevant family law areas is 
a tentative one: 
• COCA – this is discussed shortly. 
• Responsibility for adoption legislation should be combined with the day-to-day work 
that the Ministry for Children already does. 
• Status of children, currently rather awkwardly spread across various statutes including 
the Status of Children Act 1969, the Family Proceedings Act 1980 and the Births, 
Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 1995 (an update is at present 
before Parliament). 
• Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004. This statute rests with the 
Ministry of Justice, but the Minister responsible for its operations is the Minister of 
Health. In truth, much of the Act contains rules about surrogacy, access to records 
(similar to access to adoption records though broader) and other related matters. 
• Child Support Act 1991. There are logistical reasons for keeping the operational aspects 
with the Inland Revenue Department, but policy should be seen as part of the overall 
legal framework for children. 
• FVA is awkward to deal with. Its main role is to provide for the Family Court to make 
protection orders between adults, although the police can issue Police safety orders 
when called to an incident. Arguably, the Act should not be used by or against minors, 
though minors would still become protected persons on the back of an order granted to 
a parent. Where something like a protection order is needed for a minor, a beefed up 
restraining order as found in s 87 of OTA should be used. The value of anger 
management and other programmes provided for in FVA could be considered for OTA. 
Arguably, these changes to the structure of government would assist in the process of developing 
comprehensive strategies and plans as envisaged by the Children's Act. More generally, the 
principle of family and community solidarity would underlie the development and 
implementation of legal policy.  
In addition, hopefully some of the awkward tensions present in our current law could be 
ironed out. These appear in particular between OTA and COCA. The Act that embraces family 
solidarity most obviously is OTA because of its family group/whānau focus. In some respects, 
there has been a retreat from this in changes enacted in the Children, Young Persons, and Their 
Families (Oranga Tamariki) Legislation Act. The new English name of the Act rather pointedly 
has had the word "families" dropped from its title. The Act has arguably downgraded the role of 
families and upgraded the place of state and non-governmental organisations under the guise of 
"early intervention" (worthy though the aim is). Early intervention has replaced "minimal 
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intervention",43 and by definition occurs when a child does not meet the criteria for being "in 
need of care or protection".44 Non-statutory "children's teams" have been created to help the 
process.45 In the absence of a statutory mandate, we cannot really be sure what the future powers 
and orientation of the teams will be. With luck they will be benign. Perhaps they can be compared 
to an organisation like Plunket, which offers early assistance to new parents and infants. Plunket's 
services are however available across the board and not targeted. 
Nevertheless, the family group conference remains the legislative centrepiece of OTA, not 
found elsewhere in our family law. Furthermore, OTA from 1 July 2019 explicitly refers to the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities.46 Its revised principles in s 5 refer to Māori concepts such 
as mana tamaiti, whakapapa, and whanaungatanga. The new s 7AA imposes duties on the chief 
executive in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi (te Tiriti o Waitangi) (see also s 4(1)(f)). These 
things and more should inform family law more widely, and a broader focus for the Ministry for 
Children may enable this to happen. 
COCA operates on very different models. Instead of the family group conference, COCA 
relies on family dispute resolution as the main non-judicial mechanism for solving disputes. The 
paramountcy of the welfare and best interests of the child is the cornerstone, with its added 
principles in s 5. Somewhat awkwardly, the amendments to OTA in force from 1 July 2019 refer 
to the child's "well-being" (new s 4A), defined to include "welfare"47 but leaving its precise legal 
meaning obscure. COCA led the field with its strong approach to the child's views in s 6, found 
in OTA only from 2017 but with more extensive provisions than s 6.48 COCA sets out the 
fundamental role of guardians in the upbringing of children, including the guardianship of the 
court. Yet OTA emphasises the role of family, whānau, hapū, iwi, and family group in caring 
  
43  OTA, s 13(2)(b)(ii), repealed from 1 July 2019 by the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families 
(Oranga Tamariki) Legislation Act.  
44  OTA, s 14. 
45  Oranga Tamariki "Children's Teams" <www.orangatamariki.govt.nz>. The Minister for Children, the 
Hon Tracey Martin, has since announced the scrapping of children's teams: Andrew Vance "Tracey 
Martin on uplift controversy: Oranga Tamariki 'believed the child was in danger'" (4 August 2019) Stuff 
<www.stuff.co.nz>. 
46  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Oranga Tamariki) Legislation Act, s 11, inserting new s 
5(1)(b)(i) into OTA. See the Convention on the Rights of the Child, above n 4; and the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2515 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 13 December 2006, entered 
into force 3 May 2008). 
47  OTA, s 2 definition of "well-being". 
48  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Advocacy, Workforce, and Age Settings) Amendment 
Act 2016, s 8, replacing s 11 in OTA. Further additions to s 11 came into force on 1 July 2019. 
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and nurturing the child.49 OTA also has many provisions relating to guardianship and from 30 
June 2016 "special guardianship" was added in language that is demonstrably unclear.50 The 
interplay between OTA and COCA is a minefield. 
I have touched on only some of the discrepancies in the current law. The dream is for a 
Ministry for Children, Oranga Tamariki that can play an innovative role in setting family law 
policy relating to children that is comprehensive and based on family and community 
responsibility.  
As an important footnote, the Children's Commissioner must remain as a crucial 
constitutional counterpoint to the Ministry. To fulfil the role properly, the Commissioner should 
not be appointed on the recommendation of the Minister for Children but should be a 
parliamentary officer. The functions, staffing and funding of the OCC should also be expanded.51 
VI  RELATIONSHIP PROPERTY 
When enacted, the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 set New Zealand apart from Australia and 
England. Some similarities can be found in the laws of Canadian provinces but the parallels with 
Europe are stronger. The Act is sometimes referred to as a deferred community regime, one 
where "community property" is shared when the marriage ends.52 This echoes the community 
property regimes found in Europe and parts of the world colonised by European countries, most 
notably Latin America and some of the states of the United States.53 In 2002 when the 2001 
package of property and inheritance reforms came into force, the Act changed its name to the 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA) (all the name changing in New Zealand family law 
legislation must mightily confuse overseas visitors, not to mention locals). The package amended 
almost every section of the 1976 Act, but two significant policy shifts moved New Zealand away 
from its European companions: (i) it extended the law to those in de facto relationships; and (ii) 
  
49  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Oranga Tamariki) Legislation Act, s 16, inserting new  
s 13(2)(b) into OTA. 
50  OTA, ss 110, 113A and 113B, as inserted by s 22 of the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families 
(Vulnerable Children) Amendment Act 2014. See CN v Ministry of Vulnerable Children, Oranga 
Tamariki [2017] NZFC 6962, [2017] NZFLR 963 per Judge Goodwin and Chief Executive of the 
Ministry for Vulnerable Children v Grant-Shepherd [2018] NZHC 1260, [2018] NZFLR 718 per van 
Bohemen J. 
51  A simple example of an expanded role could be the new complaints mechanism for the Ministry found 
in OTA, s 7(2)(b), inserted by the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families (Oranga Tamariki) 
Legislation Act, s 13. 
52  AH Angelo and WR Atkin "A Conceptual and Structural Overview of The Matrimonial Property Act 
1976" (1977) 7 NZULR 237. 
53  On the position in the United States, see Margaret F Brinig "United States: Marital Property" in Bill 
Atkin (ed) The International Survey of Family Law 2016 Edition (Jordans, Bristol, 2016) 509. 
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it provided a mechanism for dealing with financial disadvantage, namely compensation for 
economic disparity. 
Especially in the light of its European links, the original 1976 Act can be seen as a prime 
example of family solidarity. It operates on the basis that marriage is a partnership of a kind that 
sets it apart from commercial and property transactions between strangers.54 It recognises the 
different but equal contributions of the spouses to the joint enterprise, and the mark of mutual 
support. To re-quote Barlow: "[i]t stands in contrast to individualistic notions of autonomy and 
recognises the altruism which is often required to fulfil its demands."55 One of its underlying 
premises is that the parties share the fruits of the marriage, the gains made during their period of 
cohabitation. Parting company with the classic community property regimes, it takes family 
solidarity further by treating the family home and chattels as always being within the pool for 
division. This emphasises the centrality of the home to family life and thus indirectly reinforces 
the value of non-financial contributions and the interests of children. It also reflects a bit of our 
legal history: the Joint Family Homes Act 1964 has its origins in the 19th century but was a very 
important vehicle post-World War Two in providing secure housing for a new generation of 
families and children, and importantly giving some financial security to mothers. The gender 
implications of this should not be underestimated. A recent attempt to repeal the Act failed and, 
given that some of the financial incentives to settle a home as a joint family home have gone,56 
it is a little surprising that the Act is far from being a dead letter with 86 registrations in 2016, 
and 36,000 settlements still in existence.57 
The 2001 reforms can, it is argued, be seen as consistent with family solidarity and indeed 
are a logical development of the concept. The extension to de facto relationships is a recognition 
of the social reality that an increasing number of families are non-marital and yet function in the 
same way as marriages. A "modernised reconceptualisation of family solidarity as a norm at the 
heart of family law" as Barlow has proposed58 readily encompasses de facto couples and their 
children: it is, after all, "family" solidarity, not "marriage" solidarity.  
  
54  See the magisterial statement of this by Woodhouse J in Reid v Reid [1979] 1 NZLR 572 (CA) at 580–
583. 
55  Barlow, above n 9, at 224. 
56  Such as cheap government loans and capitalisation of the family benefit. 
57  Law Commission Dividing Relationship Property – Time for Change? Te mātatoha rawa tokorau – Kua 
eke te wā? (NZLC IP41, 2017) at [31.40] and following. The author was a member of the Expert 
Advisory Group, assisting the Commission on this project. Contrary to family solidarity, the Law 
Commission recommended that pre-owned homes should not be relationship property: see Law 
Commission, above n 5, at [3.66] and following. 
58  Barlow, above n 9, at 225. 
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The law on economic disparity has proven to be an underachiever and the cause of much 
litigation. The five judgments from the Supreme Court in Scott v Williams59 advance the cause 
only a little. Finding a solution to the problems associated with the current law on economic 
disparity was one of the big challenges for the Law Commission and its project on relationship 
property. That aside however, the policy aim is very much in sympathy with the Barlow vision 
of family solidarity. The original 1976 Act enshrined equality as one of its cornerstones, a major 
leap forward from a gender point of view. However, it was soon recognised that formal gender 
equality was not the same as substantive gender equality because of the significantly disparate 
income earning capacities of the parties. Modernised family solidarity is concerned with family 
life as a whole and so, it has no problem with: 
… the principle that a just division of relationship property has regard to the economic advantages 
and disadvantages to the spouses or partners arising from their marriage, civil union, or de facto 
relationship … 
as set out in s 1N(c) of the Act. The difficulty is not with the goal but with finding a way of 
achieving the goal. 
A little contrary to family solidarity, New Zealand law from the beginning has allowed 
contracting out.60 These are still somewhat awkwardly called "prenups" even though they apply 
to de facto couples and can be entered at any time before or during a relationship. The court has 
always had a power to set aside agreements that are unjust but the 2001 reforms elevated the test 
to "serious injustice"61 and added, as a factor to which regard must be had, "the fact that the 
parties wished to achieve certainty … by entering into the agreement".62 Contracting out is an 
example of exercising autonomy, although it is autonomy for both parties, and, further, the court's 
power under s 26 to settle property on children overrides autonomy because it is "regardless of 
any agreement under Part 6".63 The United Kingdom Supreme Court accepted the legitimacy of 
contracting out only as recently as 2010 in Radmacher (formerly Granatino) v Granatino.64 
  
59  Scott v Williams [2017] NZSC 185, [2018] 1 NZLR 507. 
60  Matrimonial Property Act 1976, s 21, now spread over several sections in pt 6 of the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976. 
61  Property (Relationships) Act, s 21J. 
62  Property (Relationships) Act, s 21J(4)(e). 
63  Property (Relationships) Act, s 26(3). This power is rarely used. 
64  Radmacher (formerly Granatino) v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, [2011] 1 AC 534. See Barlow's 
critique, above n 9, at 226. 
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Lady Hale wrote a powerful dissent that reminds us that such agreements have gender 
implications and may be oppressive. Referring to the status of marriage, she said:65 
This means two things. First, the parties are not entirely free to determine all its legal consequences 
for themselves. They contract into the package which the law of the land lays down. Secondly, their 
marriage also has legal consequences for other people and for the state. Nowadays there is 
considerable freedom and flexibility within the marital package but there is an irreducible minimum. 
... The question for us is how far individual couples should be free to re-write that essential feature 
of the marital relationship as they choose.   
Later she wrote:66 
…the court hearing a particular case can all too easily lose sight of the fact that, unlike a separation 
agreement, the object of an ante-nuptial agreement is to deny the economically weaker spouse the 
provision to which she – it is usually although by no means invariably she – would otherwise be 
entitled … In short, there is a gender dimension to the issue which some may think ill-suited to 
decision by a court consisting of eight men and one woman. 
There is certainly something for New Zealanders to ponder here. 
This is not the place to proffer a blueprint for an up to date property relationships statute: the 
Law Commission's 800 plus page Issues Paper, Preferred Approach Paper and final Report testify 
to how massive the task is.67 However, the Law Commission indicated that, while the present 
Act is no longer fit for purpose, its bones are largely sound68 – arguably because they align with 
family solidarity. The major issues such as economic disparity and trusts (where family solidarity 
would in general terms endorse the stance of the Supreme Court in the Clayton litigation)69 are 
about ensuring that the right flesh grows on the skeleton. 
VII  CONCLUSION 
This article has ranged widely. It has picked up themes like child poverty and elder law in 
the midst of more traditional family law topics. That is part of the point: family law in the future 
  
65  At [132]. 
66  At [137]. 
67   Law Commission Dividing Relationship Property – Time for Change?, above n 57; Law Commission 
Review of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976: Preferred Approach – Te Arotake i te Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976: He Aronga i Mariu ai (NZLC IP44, 2018); and Law Commission Review of 
the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, above n 5. 
68  See for example Law Commission Review of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, above n 5, at [2.40] 
and following. 
69  Clayton v Clayton (Vaughan Road Property Trust) [2016] NZSC 29, [2016] 1 NZLR 551; and Clayton 
v Clayton (Claymark Trust) [2016] NZSC 30, [2016] 1 NZLR 590. 
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has to be seen in its wide context. The vision cannot be narrow. The thread through this article 
has been family and community solidarity. This motif takes relationships seriously – intimate 
relationships between adults, parent/child relationships and deep cultural connections. It is a 
positive image for the future. 
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